Let’s be frank: Gilani did not like Husain Haqqani very much.

The reasons are manifold: Haqqani’s rather cozy relationship with President Zardari riled Gilani both personally and politically. For one thing, Haqqani did not respect the normal channels that a diplomat usually follows: he reports to the Foreign Minister, his immediate superior, and then Gilani himself, his ultimate boss. Instead Haqqani reported directly to President Zardari himself. Zardari didn’t do much to deny this unusual arrangement. And given that Gilani is head of government, and the importance of Pakistan-US relations, this was a serious breach of protocol and a personal affront to him. Nor did Gilani like the bonhomie that existed between Haqqani and Zardari. They behaved more like a couple of chums which just alienated Gilani even more, making him more like an outsider then a member of the inner circle.

So when the opportunity arose to get rid of Haqqani once and for all, Gilani quickly jumped on board. How this opportunity presented itself is still an open question, but, nevertheless, it presented itself and Gilani took advantage of it. So when Memogate became public, it forced Haqqani’s resignation and embarrassing and weakening Zardari. The merits of the case are yet to be determined, of course, but in politics perception is everything. But the goal was achieved: Haqqani was out as ambassador.

Interestingly, the appointment of Sherry Rehman as Pakistan’s new Ambassador to the United States, who has clashed with Zardari in the past, is definitely Gilani’s pick, undoubtedly backed by the military and ISI. Zardari, tainted by his close relationship with Haqqani, had no choice but to accept. And here we are.

Of course this is all a conspiracy theory on my part, but it is worth thinking about.

The United States, however, has always been, at most, a reluctant imperialist. In the twentieth century it was the only Great Power that did not add to its sovereign territory as a result of war, although it was also the only one to emerge stronger than ever from each of that century’s three Great Power conflicts. Today the United States possesses only 6 percent of the world’s land area and 6 percent of its people– virtually all of whom regard themselves as Americans and speak English. And yet its influence in the world is far greater than Britain’s was at the height of its relative power in the mid-nineteenth century. [pp xxiii-xiv]

Is the United States an imperial power or global hegemon its critics say it is? This begs the question: what does imperialism mean in a 21st century, post-industrial, post-information world?

http://static.bloggingheads.tv/ramon/_live/players/player_v5.2-licensed.swf

Internal memos from the time it was based in Afghanistan demonstrate that al-Qaeda, like many of the murderous organizations that had preceded it, was highly bureaucratic. Al-Qaeda bylaws covered annual budgets; who controlled which money accounts; salary levels (including a discussion of extra pay for those members with multiple wives); the frequency of airline tickets for member of the group to visit families back home; the proper distribution of medical benefits; the scale of furniture allowances; the special provisions that were made for those with disabilities; and the grounds for dismissal from the group. Al-Qaeda even had a generation vacation policy with a week off for its married recruits for every three weeks served. Requests for vacation had to be submitted two and a half months in advance.

Sounds like the makings of an Office episode.